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  The literature reports that patents are commonly seen as isolating mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, our knowledge as to how firms manage both patents and the patenting process 
to capture the benefits realised from innovative effort is still scant. In this paper we explore 
how firms use the patenting process to enhance appropriability conditions. Based upon case 
studies of six various sized UK pharmaceutical firms our findings suggest that it is mainly by 
managing a whole portfolio of patents that firms will generate the full benefits of patents and 
limit the operations of (potential) competitors. The portfolio approach is one alternative to 
broaden the scope of protection. Along the same lines our sample firms also revealed their 
interest in broader territorial coverage. Although the protection achieved is largely determined 
by the legal framework, firms revealed that the timing of application is pivotal in determining 
the scope of the final patent grant and other related follow-up patents. 
JEL Classification: O34; O31; K11; L12 
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  11.  Introduction 
The economics literature has made huge progress over the past twenty years in 
extending our understanding of the benefits and costs of patent protection (GRANSTRAND, 
2003). Nevertheless, the business literature has not followed the same pattern. Our knowledge 
as to how firms manage both patents and the patenting process to capture the benefits realised 
from innovative effort is still scant. Insofar as competitive advantage derives not only from 
the creation and use of assets that are difficult to imitate but also from the ownership and 
protection of these assets (BARNEY, 1991), an insight into the patenting process will shed 
more light on how firms capture value from their innovative effort. 
For the purposes of this research we consider the patenting process as a series of 
patent-related events which begin at the moment an invention comes out and continue until a 
patent is issued. And this paper addresses how firms use the patenting process to enhance 
appropriability conditions. In particular, we examine what is patented, when patents are 
applied for, and where patents are registered. Answers to these questions give considerable 
insight into how firms use the patent system to build up proprietary positions in the 
marketplace and strengthen their competitive positions. 
Although there might be inter-industry differences in what concerns patenting activity 
we concentrated upon the pharmaceutical industry for as the literature has shown, 
pharmaceuticals is one of the industries where patents play a major role (LEVIN; 
KLEVORICK; NELSON; WINTER, 1987), and hence pharmaceutical firms are the most 
likely to master the process with which our study is concerned. Thus, as part of our 
exploratory approach we conducted six case studies of pharmaceutical firms established in the 
UK. 
Our findings indicate that firms are particularly keen on the scope of protection. 
According to our sample firms it is mainly by managing a whole portfolio of patents that they 
will derive the full benefits of patents and limit competitive behaviour of rivals. Moreover, in 
order to broaden the scope of protection firms tend to pursue patents in broader territorial 
coverage. And critical in determining the scope of the final patent grant and other related 
follow-up patents is the timing of patent applications. 
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appropriability.  Secondly, we explain the process a patent application generally follows 
before a patent is granted. Thirdly, we describe the research method employed. Fourthly, we 
turn to the empirical findings which are presented and discussed. Finally, we conclude. 
2.  Background 
Innovative efforts tend largely to be formally structured within firms as a research and 
development (R&D) activity (although this is not necessarily so). It is common to consider 
the output of innovative efforts as knowledge, in a general sense, and it has become topical to 
discuss two characteristics of knowledge as a good i) it is non-rivalrous, that is, it can be used 
by one economic actor without precluding its use by another and ii) it is generally only 
partially excludable (ROMER, 1993). If knowledge is not fully excludable then other agents 
may be able to access that knowledge and exploit that access to the detriment of the originator 
of that knowledge (the inventor). In such circumstances, inventors or originators of 
knowledge will be unable to appropriate the true social value of that knowledge, and, 
therefore, will be likely to underinvest in its production (ARROW, 1962). It is largely to 
correct this excludability (or alternatively appropriability) problem that patent systems have 
been developed (GEROSKI, 1995). 
Patent systems have been designed as a reward system to combat underinvestment in 
socially desirable inventive activities through the concession of a temporary monopoly over 
the outcomes of R&D, provided that those outcomes have the requirements specified by law. 
Such systems operate by providing a legal framework within which, for a fee and for a 
specific geographical area and a specified time, inventors own and are able to enforce 
property rights over the knowledge embodied in their patent grant. However, patents not only 
give property rights to inventors they also require that the knowledge to be patented must be 
disclosed to the world. This has the social benefit of re-basing future research activity but may 
have a private cost in that any benefits of secrecy over the patented knowledge are no longer 
available. However, the usefulness of the patent system should not be distorted. As Arrow 
(1962) observed, the extent that patents are successful, they may provide an underutilisation 
of the information disclosed. A conflict emphasised by Scotchmer (1991), who observed that 
stronger protection granted to the first generation of producers might lead to higher costs for 
the second generation of producers. Moreover, despite its relatively high importance in some 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, the role played by patents as incentives for innovation 
  3seems to be less important than the market structure that precedes the generation of 
knowledge and that is imposed by using the knowledge (BENKLER, 2001). 
Competitive advantage derives from the creation, ownership, protection and use of 
assets that are difficult to imitate (BARNEY, 1991). In a knowledge-based economy those 
assets are often argued to be knowledge, and thus an emerging stream in the literature has 
advocated that the firm is a repository of knowledge, and knowledge, as opposed to tangible 
resources, is the most strategically relevant resource (GRANT, 1996). As such, differences in 
knowledge stock, and in its development and deployment, lead to differences in firms’ 
performance (FOSS, 1996 a,b; GRANT, 1996). 
As superior performance is seen as dependent on the ability of firms to be good at 
innovation, protecting intangible knowledge assets and using them (TEECE, 2001), it is in 
firms’ best interests to avoid imitation of knowledge assets. To this end, firms can use 
mechanisms that are impediments to the imitative dissipation of rents (RUMELT, 1987). 
Those mechanisms are known as isolating mechanisms, and analogous to them are 
appropriability mechanisms (TEECE, 1986), which focus on avoiding replication and 
capturing value from knowledge assets. Patents are typical isolating/ appropriability 
mechanisms to the extent that they enable knowledge creators to deter imitation. Thus, they 
are expected to be part of firms’ strategy, at least for those technology-based firms. 
Although imitation barriers, such as patents, can influence the creation of sustainable 
competitive advantage, recombination of knowledge in creative ways to pursue new market 
opportunities is also critical (KOGUT; ZANDER, 1993). Firms, therefore, may specialize in 
the creation and transfer of knowledge (KOGUT; ZANDER, 1996), even if knowledge 
spillovers are associated with the way research is structured amongst firms in a particular 
industry (KEEP; OMURA; CALANTONE, 1994). Thus, firms evolve in part through the 
combination of knowledge, and hence they are keen on controlling how knowledge is 
transferred both within and outside their boundaries (KOGUT; ZANDER, 1996). However, 
organisational structures and management practices that develop and leverage knowledge 
within a variety of innovation contexts are difficult to build up (COLLINSON, 2001). Even 
intra-firm transfer of knowledge has proved to be difficult (what is referred to in the literature 
as knowledge ‘stickiness’). Szulanski (1996) argues that organisations ‘do not know what 
they know’ because of knowledge-related barriers (e.g., absorptive capacity, difficulties in the 
relationship between source and recipient) rather than their lack of willingness to learn. 
  4There are elaborate definitions of what knowledge is, but it is most typically defined in 
two categories: i) explicit (or codified) knowledge, and ii) tacit (or implicit) knowledge 
(POLANYI, 1967). The former is knowledge about facts and theories, can be transmitted via 
formal systematic language, and as a consequence can be captured more easily than tacit 
knowledge. The latter is experientially based, that is, it is personal, it is specific to a domain, 
and more difficult to be formatted, communicated and shared with others. Even if for the 
purpose of this paper we do not envisage any additional benefit in a more elaborated treatment 
of knowledge, we should be cautious in using the above dichotomous categories since the 
extent that knowledge is explicit/ tacit may vary in degree, and these categories are perhaps 
the extreme points of a spectrum (SAVIOTTI, 1998). Moreover, the tacit/ explicit approach 
may lead to a comparison of ease/ difficulty in transmission/ use of knowledge that may be 
misleading. As observed by Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) such a dichotomy does not address 
a proper comparison because tacitness and codification are not simple properties of 
knowledge itself. They are partly influenced by economic incentives and other social/ 
institutional processes. Kogut and Zander (1992), however, observed that intra-firm transfer 
of tacit knowledge is more likely to happen than is inter-firm transfer. Moreover, they 
detected that tacit knowledge is in fact slower to be transferred. Nevertheless, despite 
knowledge being difficult to transfer an innovator should be concerned about other firms 
having access to his/ her knowledge. Other firms’ own knowledge may enable them to codify, 
absorb, and transform new knowledge at various degrees, and perhaps on occasions derive 
more value from the transferred knowledge than its originator. 
Because of the fuzzy boundaries of property rights and of the nature of knowledge, a 
key challenge for top management is to figure out how to protect and retain the firm’s own 
knowledge. The ease/ difficulty with which knowledge can be transferred poses challenges to 
managers who need to control the flow of knowledge if the returns of the creation of this 
knowledge are to be appropriated. There have been attempts to unveil how firms use granted 
patents to appropriate the returns from knowledge they create (GRAHAM; SOMAYA, 2004; 
GRANSTRAND, 1999; LEVIN ET AL., 1987; PITKETHLY, 2001; THUMM, 2001), and 
some effort has been put on understanding how patent characteristics affect firms’ 
performance (HALL, 2000; REITZIG 2004 a,b; TOIVANEN, STONEMAN, BOSWORTH, 
2002) but none has devoted attention to the patenting process itself. 
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known as to the impact of the patenting process on firms’ ability to recoup the expenses with 
the creation of knew knowledge. We conjecture that an insight into the patenting process 
should be helpful to unravel how firms may tighten appropriability through that process, and 
hence how they increase the likelihood of appropriating the returns from innovation. The 
underlying rationale for our interest in the patenting process is that patents’ characteristics are 
dependent not only on the corresponding inventions but also on the decisions made along that 
process. 
3.  The Process of Obtaining a Patent: General Issues 
A patent is a legal title issued upon application as long as the application fulfils some 
requirements (e.g., novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability). The date a patent 
application is first filed is labeled the priority date, and it is used to evaluate prior knowledge 
to the application. A patent application may be filed in a national patent office or in supra-
national patent offices, such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). Once a 
patent application is filed it will be either examined or registered. The latter case implies that 
a patent will automatically be granted and its validity will only be tested in court. 
Nevertheless, it is common practice amongst most countries to demand an examination of the 
application before a patent is (or not) granted (CORNISH, 1999). 
Overall, patent applications and the examination procedure are conditional on fees that 
may have to be paid on filing. Within twelve months the applicant
1 (i.e. patentee) must 
request, and pay the corresponding fee for the preliminary examination - to check whether the 
application is able to proceed - and search – to look for any relevant document which may 
invalidate or restrict what is claimed in a patent application. There is no need to wait 12 
months to request preliminary examination and search, it can be done on filing since the 
priority date is the one taken into account to determine prior art. The applicant may, however, 
decide for whatever the reason to file a new patent application, but comprising the same 
inventive concept, claiming priority from the first one - so called internal priority (GRUBB, 
1999). 
Unless the one who applied for a patent (applicant) withdraws his/ her application, or 
simply abandon it, the invention will be disclosed soon. An invention can be kept secret until 
the 18
th month from the priority date, and then the patent application is published
2. From that 
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implies that everyone is entitled to know what the patent is about. Inventors however do not 
have to wait up to the 18
th month to have their inventions publicly disclosed. They have the 
option to request an acceleration of the procedure, and hence their invention will be disclosed 
earlier. 
After a patent application is published it will start soon another stage of the 
prosecution. This stage is also made upon request, within six months of the publication date. 
This phase is the substantive examination which is carried out by a patent examiner, who aims 
to investigate whether or not the invention claimed meets the requirements of novelty, 
inventive step and industrial applicability. The first requirement, novelty, means that only 
new inventions can be patented. If an invention is publicly disclosed before a patent 
application is filed it will not be able of protection. This previous disclosure is known as 
either prior art or state of the art of the technological field. The second requirement by 
definition is reached whenever an invention is not obvious to someone with a good 
knowledge and experience in the corresponding technical field. Finally, the requirement of 
industrial applicability implies the invention to be possible to be carried out in practice 
(WIPO, 1997). The patent examiner may or may not settle an objection against the applicant. 
In general, both parties reach an agreement and a patent is issued. Notwithstanding, to keep a 
patent in force the patentee must pay renewal fees periodically (e.g. yearly) until the patentee 
thinks the patent should be enforced, which is no necessarily the end of the term of protection. 
Patent systems operate at single country levels (e.g. UK, US) and at supra-national 
levels (e.g. EPO, WIPO). There is no such a thing as an international patent covering all 
countries in the world. Even if a company chooses to use one of those supra-national systems, 
it has to designate all countries of interest (as long as the chosen countries have signed any 
treaty agreeing with the rules of the system) and pay the corresponding fees. Otherwise, 
anyone in the country not designated is entitled to freely use that invention. Patentees can 
apply to more than one national patent office individually. In this case, they can make use of 
one of the most important treaties: The Paris Convention. The Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property is a multilateral treaty which dates back to 1883. In essence, 
it gives the patent applicant 12 months from the first filing (priority date) to apply for a patent 
to any other signatory country without risks of losing priority due to intervening prior art. 
Therefore, if any prior art appears within those 12 months it will not be considered against the 
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patent may be crucial to the applicant forfeiting his/her rights. 
Despite the advantage of this 12 months period when the country is a signatory of the 
Paris Convention, the option of going to national patent offices individually, as opposed to 
using supra-national patent offices, implies earlier patenting costs. The non-use of supra-
national routes means that expenses with translations and patent attorneys services necessary 
to prosecute the application in the desired country have to be made earlier. This is so because 
the objective of supra-national routes is to make the acquisition of intellectual property easier 
and more uniform, and hence more beneficial (economic) conditions are offered. The 
European Patent Office (EPO), for example, is responsible for carrying out a single 
patentability examination (though patent applications are considered by a committee of three 
examiners), which can make it simpler and less costly compared to several individual 
applications. A patent to be granted by the EPO can be obtained by filing a single application 
in one of the official languages of that organisation (i.e., English, French or German) in a 
unitary procedure before the EPO and is valid in as many of the contracting states as the 
applicant designates. If the EPO grants a patent the applicant then may need to file 
translations in each designated European member country
3 and pay national fees (Grubb 
1999). If the objective, however, is to protect the invention in as many countries as possible, 
the alternative route is the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT)
4, though it does not cover all the 
countries in the world; there are a few countries which are non-signatories of the PCT
5. The 
Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) was first signed in 1970 and came into force in 1978. The 
PCT was mainly designed to make international applications simpler for the residents of the 
signatory countries and it seems that its popularity has increased (GRUPP; SCHMOCH, 
1999). Also, in the same way as the Paris Convention, the PCT allows the applicant to file a 
PCT application within 12 months of the priority date. 
Initially the applicant only needs to file a single document designating the states where 
protection is likely to be sought; neither translation nor payment of national fees is necessary, 
though other fees (e.g., search fees) need to be paid. The application at this first phase (so 
called ‘Chapter I’) will be submitted to a first simple examination, and a search in prior art 
will be made to enable the applicant to judge whether it is worth proceeding with the 
application. Based upon the search report the applicant may amend the patent application 
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according to the prior art. 
After the application is published the applicant has to choose to proceed to a 
preliminary international examination report, which will give an opinion on patentability (this 
is the second phase and is also called ‘Chapter II’). If the decision is positive, the entry into 
the national phase will be postponed, unless any designated country is not elected under 
Chapter II. If the applicant’s decision is negative he/ she will face all the costs related to the 
national phase (e.g. patent attorneys, translation) no later than 20 months from the priority 
date. A positive decision may delay such costs up to 30 months from the priority date
6. At 
that time, and based upon the international preliminary examination report, the applicant may 
decide whether or not to proceed with the application into the national phase, and later follow 
national procedures. 
4.  Research Method 
Each research strategy has its own advantages and disadvantages, and different sorts 
of questions require different methods (PUNCH, 1999). Maxwell (1998) asserts that the 
selection of the research method depends not only on the research questions, but on the actual 
research situation and what will work most effectively in that situation to give the information 
needed. Yin (1994) suggests that the choice of a research strategy should be according to i) 
the type of research question; ii) the control that an investigator has over actual behavioural 
events; and iii) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena. As our 
objective is to understand how firms deal with the patenting process, in particular how some 
decision variables take place along that process, we chose a qualitative approach to our 
research.  Our choice for a qualitative approach was reliant on the major strength of that 
approach which is its ability to get at the processes by which events and actions take place, 
processes that experimental and survey research are often poor at identifying (MAXWELL, 
1998). Thus, we run case studies of pharmaceutical firms established in the UK. 
We focused on the pharmaceutical industry primarily because the literature reports 
that this industry is the one where patents play a major role. As such it would be more likely 
to yield the information we were looking for. The UK was the geographic area chosen to 
develop this study as it has a tradition of research on patent-related issues and exhibits an 
intensive use of patents. According to statistics from the World Intellectual Property 
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patent applications in the world in 2005 (excluding supra national offices), accounting for 
nearly 28,000 applications. Also the UK is still one of the major sources of technology in the 
world. 
Face-to-face interviews were the data collection tools used because, according to 
Kvale (1996, p.105), they are “particularly suited for studying people’s understandings of the 
meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and 
clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world”. In order to check the 
suitability of the interview guide and the way the questions were organised a pilot interview 
was undertaken with the head of intellectual property of a pharmaceutical company. 
Interviews were run with the person in charge of patents in each company. Prior to any 
meeting a checklist of topics that would be addressed was forwarded to the interviewees. 
A requirement for the validity of a research design is that the sample must fit in with 
other components of the study (MILES; HUBERMAN, 1994). Our sample derives from a 
report produced yearly by the UK Department of Trade and Industry, also known as R&D 
Scoreboard, which lists R&D spenders in the UK and abroad. As for the UK there were fifty-
four pharmaceuticals firms listed. The main criteria to select the companies would be their 
size and their innovative effort – attributes that are known as determinants of inter-firm 
differences in patenting behaviour (SCHERER, 1983). We ended up collecting information 
from six pharmaceutical companies and pivotal for us not to pursue an amplification of our 
sample size was the similar pattern of information obtained from the sample, which did not 
justify further effort to gather redundant evidence. In particular because the information 
gathered was based upon a sample that presented the variability of attributes (i.e. size and 
innovative effort) that we were pursuing (Table 1). On average the interviews lasted ninety 
minutes each and were tape recorded to facilitate content analysis, which was addressed by 
grouping interviewees comments on general (i.e. what, where, when to patent) and specific 
(e.g. scope, timing, follow-up applications, returns foreseen, technology content) topics of 
interest. Our findings are presented in the next section. 
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A  3,000  –  3,500  3 600 360 57 
B 100  –  150  Nil  9  7.8  3 
C  50 – 100   Nil  75  1  8.6 
D  100,000+  104 15,000 17,200 2,600 
E  50,000+  45 10,000 11,400 1,900 
F 1,000  –  1,500  6  NA  498  106 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
From the outset interviewees stated that the basic premise of the pharmaceutical 
industry is that in order to get reasonable returns from the investments in R&D a temporary 
monopoly provided by patents is necessary. This is in line with prior literature that both 
advocates the importance of patents for pharmaceuticals (e.g., GRABOWSKY; VERNON, 
2000), and stresses firms’ concern with the extent knowledge is transferred (e.g., KOGUT; 
ZANDER, 1996; RUMELT, 1987). Despite firms’ concern with appropriability, interviewees 
reported that secrecy (either by trade secrets or ‘pure’ secrecy) is rather important when it is 
difficult to police the invention, such as processes and equipments. In addition, they revealed 
that there might be situations where know-how is outdated at a high rate, and hence it might 
not be worth seeking patent protection because there would be resources allocated to 
something that would have its value deteriorated too soon. 
The interviews revealed that firms’ practice is largely to patent new products. A 
pharmaceutical product, however, can take various forms. For instance, it can be a chemical 
entity, which in general is the active ingredient responsible for fighting against a disease 
(some of these compounds are not active themselves but are metabolised in the body to form 
an active drug, they are known as prodrugs); it can be a composition (a combination of two or 
more active ingredients, or combination of a pharmaceutical carrier with a compound not used 
as a drug before), or a drug delivery system (which is a composition that its constituents 
enable to be administered in a particular way). 
Although product patents are the dominant type firms reported that they also consider 
process patents and new use patents. The former refer to inventions which describe new ways 
of manufacturing a product. The latter relate to substances or compositions which did not 
have prior pharmaceutical use, or had it had a pharmaceutical use before, it was for different 
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interviewees these patents tend to be the most difficult to rivals overcome. For example, there 
might be alternative routes to manufacture a product but those are easier to bypass than the 
product itself. If competitors develop new processes to manufacture a patented product they 
will only be able (in the absence of a licence) to market the process itself and not the product. 
To develop and to market a new competing product competitors will require more resources 
(financial and time) than simply copying an invention. A product patent will therefore delay 
competition and help in appropriating the returns from innovation. This is consistent with the 
literature (e.g., GRANSTRAND, 1999; LEVIN ET AL., 1987). Moreover, interviewees also 
pointed out that the difficulty and resultant high costs associated with the development of new 
drugs have been increasing the importance of patents relating to drug delivery systems. These 
inventions may provide more effective ways for an existing drug to be released into the body, 
an attribute that may strengthen firms competitive positioning. 
Although when an invention is a pharmacologically active ingredient patents work 
best as isolating mechanisms because they protect the product however it is made or 
formulated, interviewees also revealed that they seek protection not only for the marketed 
product itself, but also for as many embodiments of the invention as possible. They stated that 
if what is patented is only the product which is commercialised (which perhaps is the optimal 
or the most feasible form of the invention), a minor change in the conceptual invention will 
possibly give competitors the opportunity to access the market with a competing product. 
Although a slight modification may not result in a patentable invention (it may be deemed 
obvious by patent examiners, for example), it may enable competitors to operate freely 
without infringing a patent holder’s rights. This means that a patent was circumvented (or 
invented around), and hence innovators’ ability to capture value from innovation was 
mitigated. 
Respondents also stressed that should a firm come up with a breakthrough invention 
that will possibly serve as a platform technology for others, the benefits of patents may be 
particularly high. As a result firms might attempt to pursue intellectual property rights not 
only upon the technology directly related to their own products but also upon other 
technology fields around. These findings are in line with what Granstrand (1999) observed for 
Japanese firms. According to our sample firms, this phenomenon (also known as ‘blanketing’ 
or ‘flooding’) is most likely when there is an emerging technology which is not close to the 
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‘blanketing’ phenomena have happened, for example, amongst biotech firms. So, the life 
cycle of technology seems to influence firms patenting behaviour. According to Cardinal, 
Alessandri and Turner (2001) it is expected that the technology life cycle impacts on the 
codifiability of knowledge because firms in developed and developing fields tend to have 
different processes through which knowledge is generated and transferred throughout the 
value chain (R&D, production, marketing sales). Saviotti (1998) also observed that the more 
mature a technology field is the easier it is for firms codify knowledge in that field, which our 
sample firms seem to corroborate. 
Respondents also said that they aim to patent anything that may stop them moving 
forward freely. That includes products or processes (and machines) that are not part of their 
business, or that come up as a result of non-routine activities, but that may be valuable to 
other firms. In other cases an invention may not lie in a firm’s core business but may be 
useful to commercialise the innovation. Thus, in addition to patenting the technology that 
leads to the commercialised product firms may also attempt to pursue property rights over 
complementary technologies that can improve a product’s performance or its differentiability. 
According to Arora et al. (2000) the control of these complementary technologies is a major 
incentive for firms to invest in R&D. Although smaller firms of our sample seemed to be 
more selective because of financial constraints they did mention to consider that behaviour 
vis-à-vis the benefits foreseen. 
According to the interviews, it seems that the degree of excludability achieved by 
using patents depends on the extent that several parts of the invention are also patented. 
Although the nucleus of the invention is the therapeutic agent, if there are various ways to 
formulate the product, more effective forms of releasing the active ingredient in the organism, 
or even other uses for the product and these variations are also in a company’s patent 
portfolio, that company has more freedom to operate and more power to block others trying to 
launch a competing product. For this reason non-product patents (e.g., process and new use 
patents) may appear, if they do so, later in the drug discovery process (or perhaps even after a 
product is launched on the market). So, by securing property rights on the various aspects of 
an invention the innovator is more likely to reach a higher degree of excludability, raising 
higher barriers to competitors. This should facilitate the capture of higher returns to R&D. 
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operate as isolating mechanisms (WERNERFELT, 1984), it overlooks the conditions under 
which patents can be more effective, or which patent attributes are more likely to enhance the 
level of excludability and how the patenting process might be related to these attributes. Our 
results add to the current knowledge by showing that firms are able, to a certain degree, to 
manipulate the breadth of a patent (an attribute that seems to impact on the extent patents can 
be effective). Although patent examiners may restrict the scope of a patent and an originally 
broad patent application may become a narrow one, interviewees said that they rarely have the 
scope of their patents severely restricted to the extent that they immediately drop a patent. 
This finding is particularly useful for the literature on appropriability mechanisms because it 
shows that innovators’ decisions to patent (or not) also encompass an analysis about how 
isolating (or strong) a patent can be. If proper attention is not drawn to the necessary resources 
that will extend the breadth of a patent application, imitators may be able to easily bypass 
innovators’ granted patents. 
The above suggests that broader patents are preferred to narrow patents. 
Notwithstanding, firms should not pursue broader patents indiscriminately. Narrow patents 
are not necessarily to be ignored even if on average they are of lesser value. By their own 
nature broad patents extend the coverage of the protection of the invention, and this requires 
more resources. Thus, narrow patents might be applied for more quickly than broad patents 
and hence provide earlier (but less extensive) protection. According to interviewees this might 
be particularly useful if competition is severe. Our sample firms also informed that in 
comparison to narrow patents broad patents are more likely to have any part of it invalid. In 
general, patents that present a scope too broad also present higher degree of abstraction that 
with the information therein is hard to properly substantiate what is claimed. Even if patent 
examiners do not make severe objections during the substantive examination of a patent 
application, a competitor may challenge a patent in court and legally restrict its scope. In 
addition, our findings revealed that a narrow patent can be particularly valuable when it 
embraces the lowest cost process. As observed by interviewees even if competitors 
circumvent the patent on the lowest cost process they will not be able to obtain a cost 
advantage. Our limited evidence thus suggests that there is always a balance to be struck 
between the degree of excludability sought and the risks associated with that. For example, 
although broad patents are harder for rivals to circumvent they demand more resources and 
time that may lead a firm not to win a patent race. 
  14One can observe from the above that there is a relationship between the timing a 
patent application is filed and the breadth of protection. As a matter of illustration, we start 
this discussion briefly explaining a typical route to drug discovery (Figure 1). In 
pharmaceuticals, research and development activities may last several years before a product 
is first launched on the market (perhaps an average of 12 years). The initial phase starts with 
the identification of targets – the points at which therapeutic agents should intervene in order 
to fight a disease. Using a high throughput screening search thousands of compounds are 
tested, and hopefully some compounds (lead compounds) will be able to act on those targets. 
After the identification of those active compounds, a series of experiments takes place aimed 
at changing the structure of those compounds in order to optimise their activity (lead 
optimisation). If that is successful, a candidate drug will go to the longest and, according to 
the interviewees, most expensive stage: development. We are interested in where in this 
process patenting is likely to occur. A typical response from the interviewees was that firms 
tend to start to apply for patents as soon as they have a promising compound (italics in Figure 
1 above). This means that patent applications start to be filed just after the screening phase, 
(i.e., during lead identification and lead optimisation), which according to the interviewees 
have already demanded between 10 and 20 percent of the total resources necessary to bring a 
product to the market. This corroborates the view that patents are applied for at an early stage 
of the research and development process (GRABOWSKY; VERNON, 2000). 
Figure 1 – Simplified Model of a Route of Drug Discovery 
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Although such early filing may be peculiar to pharmaceuticals, it is not unreasonable 
to extrapolate to other industries insofar as patent systems are characterized by ‘the winner 
takes all system’. But filing a patent application early means that firms may not have a clear 
picture of whether or not the product launched onto the market will be exactly the same as 
that first identified. On many occasions firms do not know whether the product will be 
launched because it will not have yet passed through clinical trials. Furthermore, respondents 
emphasised that R&D is an ongoing process and there are always new results coming out, 
  15which will also be analysed as to their patentability. Thus, even after a patent application is 
first filed, there might appear new results that are also likely to be patented. Depending on 
when new results appear they may or may not be incorporated in the first patent application.  
Respondents revealed that in order to avoid lagging behind in patent races one 
alternative is to go for a number of different patent applications covering the same or similar 
embodiments of an invention that may (or may not) be dropped later in the process. 
Innovators reported that more than one patent application embracing different scopes can be 
filed at the same time. According to the respondents this is more likely to happen when the 
pressure to patent earlier is very high and the information available on the invention is still 
very limited. So, one can file both narrow and broad patent applications at the same time. 
Narrow filings rely upon the results obtained up to the time of filing whereas broad filings 
rely upon inventors’ expertise as to the extent that an invention can be broadened in the near 
future and thus have a more speculative character. If future results come out and are able to 
support the broader application then one can drop the narrow application and progress the 
broader one. Likewise, if the results are not enough to support the broader application this can 
be dropped and the narrower application progressed. 
Alternatively, firms pointed out that they make use of internal priority whenever 
possible. That is, they file a first patent application, but within twelve months from the 
priority date they may file a new application claiming priority over the first one. That occurs 
if the new outcomes of R&D are deemed to be important enough to be specified in a patent 
application since those outcomes will enable the applicant to better substantiate what is 
claimed. As a result, a stronger patent
7 is more likely to be achieved. It was a common view 
among the respondents that they seek excludability based upon not only a single patent but 
also a whole portfolio of patents, which comprises both narrow and broad patents that 
combined enable them to fence-in the market for their innovations. 
Respondents also said that depending on the new results they may decide to apply for 
other patents within the priority year instead of claiming priority over the first application. 
That is a judgement based on whether or not the new results will be able to originate a new 
patent application that does not infringe the first one; and also whether or not it is likely that 
someone else will file an earlier patent application. When the new output is going to provide 
only small differences from the first filing and/ or when the perceived competition is very 
high, it is more likely that firms will use internal priority. Nevertheless, not all results from 
  16further experimentation appear within twelve months of a filing and, therefore, priority over 
the first patent application cannot necessarily be claimed. The alternative is to file a new 
patent application. As the new filing embraces other variations of the invention one could 
expect that it would be deemed to be obvious (no inventive step) by the patent examiner and, 
therefore, a patent would not be issued on that. It was pointed out to us that if those new 
results come out before the priority filing is published (at most within 18 months from priority 
date) the risks of that filing being opposed as to its inventive step are low (not taking into 
account what someone else is doing). That happens because the former application has not yet 
been published and therefore the latter does not have to be inventive over something that was 
not in the public domain. Using one of the respondents’ words: 
‘(…) if you file a lot of applications on similar things then you should 
do it before publication [of the first filing].  (…) once it [the first filing] 
is published if you then file them [follow up applications], they have to 
be new and inventive’. 
These findings suggest that the argument by Kogut and Zander (1993) that 
recombination of knowledge is critical to pursue new market opportunities can also be 
extended to the patenting process since recombination of knowledge may generate different 
outputs that demand approaches to patenting accordingly. Given that patents have a fixed life, 
the timing of patent applications may considerably affect the time that a product will be 
protected on the market. If a larger part of the fixed patent term is devoted to further research 
and development, then the period in which protected revenues can be earned will be shorter. 
This would encourage later rather than earlier application, which in a first to file regime could 
be critical. In order to partially overcome this issue and extend the period of protection, the 
interviewees said that at least in pharmaceuticals they may apply for a Supplemental 
Protection Certificate
8 (SPC). Although particular to the European Economic Area, this 
evidence suggests that the territorial dimension might be another important aspect when 
considering what and when to patent. 
Appropriation of revenues derived from innovative effort is dependent on firms’ 
ability to explore their knowledge in other geographical markets for which patents can also be 
pursued. There was a common response among the sample firms studied as to where patents 
should be secured. All six companies agreed that the US, Europe (Western) and Japan are the 
major territories where they should seek patent protection. The chief reason pointed out by the 
  17informants was that these countries are the largest markets for pharmaceuticals. The interest 
in these markets does not mean that the firms studied do not apply for patents in other 
territories. According to the interviewees, depending on the perceived impact of the invention 
on their businesses, they can go beyond these major markets. In general, what they reported 
was that they have a pre-determined list of countries where patent applications are likely to be 
filed. 
Our findings indicate that applications were reported to be motivated mainly by the 
economic prospects of the invention, which corroborates what Bertin and Wyatt (1988) found 
for multinationals. This suggests that patents taken out in countries where firms operate, or 
foresee participating (e.g., producing, exporting, licensing) in the near future, are likely the 
most valuable patents. If firms do not envisage doing business in the near future in a particular 
country, interviewees reported that they still may apply for a patent in that country. If the size 
of the market justifies patenting expenses and there are potential competitors present in that 
market firms revealed that patenting means that the market is an option kept available. 
When firms decide that a patent application will be filed it also has to decide whether 
or not the invention will be filed locally first before it is filed in other countries. We were told 
that the patent applications of a UK company, for example, will not always be filed first in the 
UK. Some of the firms have R&D units abroad and they need to follow local rules, that 
demand inventions created in their territories to be filed first there before anywhere else. 
Regarding the decision to patent abroad the favourite route according to the respondents is 
through the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT); though attention was also drawn to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and to the Paris Convention. When firms choose to go straight 
to other countries’ patent offices, as opposed to the PCT, firms reported that they need to pay 
attention to whether or not the country is a signatory of the Paris Convention. If so, they tend 
to use perhaps the most practical aspect of the Paris Convention which is the possibility of 
claiming priority for applications made in another territory within 12 months from priority 
date
9. If the country is not a ‘Convention country’, the firms aim to make sure that the 
invention will not be publicly disclosed after the first filing and are more likely to rush to file 
in that country in order to avoid forfeiting property rights (in particular because someone else 
may have filed between the date they first filed and the date they filed in a country that is not 
a signatory of the Paris Convention). 
  18If the interest is just in the European market firms are more likely to use the European 
Patent Office (EPO) route. However, if the markets targeted do not justify the costs of this 
route (economies of scale may not apply), they may go straight to the respective patent 
offices. The PCT route is considered when there are markets of interest which are not covered 
by the EPO, and most of the time that is the usual route that firms follow. As costs increase 
the greater the number of countries a firm applies to, the PCT may be of great advantage since 
it might be cheaper than filing in each of the target countries (as with the EPO route it all 
depends on the number of countries designated). Thus, the main advantages of the PCT were 
considered to be: firms can delay the bulk of the costs which arise when the application goes 
to the national phase; firms can have a better idea of the invention before they incur these 
costs; and firms have both a search and a preliminary examination report that gives a fair idea 
of the patentability of the invention before the costs of the national phase, which may reduce 
uncertainty relating to the level of protection. 
Another factor affecting the choice of the country where patent protection is sought is 
the extent that firms can enforce their property rights. Again, US, Western Europe and Japan 
were cited as examples of places where legal frameworks are consistent and have the 
appropriate expertise in case of litigation. Moreover, according to the interviewees, patent 
office personnel in these territories are more skilful in dealing with patent issues and with 
operational procedures. So, in deciding where to register their patents, the proprietary position 
sought may be important. Although patenting everywhere is associated to a broader 
proprietary position, not all patents are of high commercial importance, and hence the costs of 
the patenting process may not justify the benefits of the protection achieved. So, a difficult 
balance needs to be struck between costs and coverage. According to Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe (2000) patenting in a large number of countries may reflect a lack of maturity of 
the applicant. The authors advocate that for many technologies it is enough to combine 
patenting in the largest markets with economies of scale to get worldwide protection. Our 
sample firms did not fully reconcile with their argument since. Although our evidence is that 
the choice of where to secure property rights is to a large extent dependent on the size of the 
market, the legal framework, the perceived importance of the invention for the business, and, 
the costs associated with that, firms also revealed that the innovative skills of competitors are 
also taken into consideration. 
  196.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored how UK pharmaceutical firms use the patenting 
process to enhance appropriability. The results arise from a series of interviews with 
appropriate personnel in six various sized pharmaceutical firms, and although it might be 
difficult to generalise we have no reason to believe that the views expressed are not typical of 
the pharmaceutical industry, though they may not be typical of all manufacturing industry. 
Our exploratory approach revealed that it is mainly by managing a whole portfolio of patents 
that firms will generate the full benefits of patents and limit the operations of (potential) 
competitors. Thus, theoretical justification for patenting should not fully rely upon the idea 
that holding a single patent will generate adequate excludability because it does not fit the 
facts (although a patent with a broad scope may be rather effective). The portfolio approach is 
beneficial to the inventor because it enables him/her to secure property rights on several 
variants of an invention (making inventing around more difficult) as well as on 
complementary technologies that may improve a product’s performance or its 
differentiability. 
Our findings suggest that patent applications across borders are mainly determined by 
economic issues. Although the protection achieved is largely determined by the legal 
framework, the timing of application seems to be quite important in determining the scope of 
the final patent grant and other related application (if any). The ongoing character of the R&D 
process as well as uncertainty due to competition require patent applicants to make decisions 
on filing patents based upon actual results and future contingencies. Our evidence thus 
suggests that the timing of application influences the ability patents have to protect rents 
derived from innovations. 
Some final reflections seem to be in order. Firstly, the portfolio approach observed by 
studying a few pharmaceutical firms indicates their concern with substitute and 
complementary innovations. It is not unsurprising that the market perceives high patent 
numbers as representing the difficulty of appropriating the benefits of R&D
10. On the other 
hand, high patent numbers may reflect the strength of firms’ technological base upon which 
they compete. Thus, a deeper analysis has to be carried out if one is willing to understand 
what the figures mean. Secondly, the effective patent life in pharmaceuticals is often claimed 
to be rather short. The degree to which patent legislation should accommodate this is unclear. 
If policy makers are keen on taking this issue further, patent breadth, as expected (MATUTES 
  20ET AL., 1996), has revealed itself to be an important element of the patent system design that 
can be used to decrease deadweight loss. Finally, the empirical analysis of patent races should 
be very cautious about using crude patent counts. Although dynamic economies of scale 
(‘success breeds success’) may take place, patents may be taken out at various points in time 
for various reasons. For example, the first patent (priority patent) is applied for early in the 
innovation process so that improvements can be made before the final innovation is 
commercialized and new patent applications filed; or the ‘surrounding’ strategy pursued by 
firms may underscore the possibility of innovations being complements, and thus one may 
conclude that earlier innovations were motivated by later ones. In total, however, the evidence 
provided by the six firms is perhaps a rather thin foundation upon which to make general 
statements, thus a more comprehensive, and representative, sample is needed. 
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1 The individual or organisation that applies for a patent.  Under the US law the applicants must be inventors.  If 
they work in an organisation they need to legally assign all or limited rights under a patent to that organisation 
(assignee). 
2 This practice has also been adopted by the USPTO since 29
th November 2000 (JOHNSON; POPP, 2001). 
3 As of 2004 there are 29 contracting States of the European Patent Office: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 
4 If one is solely interested in countries that are members of the European Patent Convention, the European 
Patent Office is an alternative to the PCT route. The choice between PCT and EPO is not mutually exclusive. 
5 As of September 2004 there are 124 signatory countries of the PCT. 
6 If the route after the PCT is the EPO, those deadlines are 21 and 31 months, respectively. 
7 A patent that can be stood in court if it is challenged by someone else.   23
                                                                                                                                                          
8 This is a certificate issued by members of the European Economic Area (i.e. EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway), which extends for up to five years the term of protection over an invention which has to 
undergo an administrative authorisation procedure required by law before it is put on the market. 
9 The date upon which either a patent application is filed (in first-to-file regimes) or an invention is conceived (in 
first-to-invent regimes). 
10 See Toivanen et al. (2002). 